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RICHARD E. NISBETT 
We examined people’s ability to assess everyday life correlations such as the 
degree of agreement that exists for various kinds of evaluations and the degree of 
consistency that characterizes social behavior from occasion to occasion. We 
found substantial accuracy for correlation estimates if two conditions were met: 
(1) subjects were highly familiar with the data in question and (2) the data were 
highly “codable,” that is, capable of being unitized and interpreted clearly. We 
generally found extreme inaccuracy if either of these conditions was not met. 
Subjects were particularly inaccurate about correlations involving social be- 
havior: They severely overestimated the stability of behavior across occasions. In 
addition, even subjects who were statistically sophisticated showed limited ap- 
preciation of the nggregarion principle, that is, the rule that the magnitude of a 
correlation increases with the number of units of evidence on which observations 
are based. 0 1986 Academic Press. Inc. 
Jane liked the movie; will you? Bill and you have served on several 
committees and he has always seemed very fair and very agreeable; 
would he make a good chairman? Our answers to such questions guide 
the conduct of our daily lives. Everything from the degree of pleasure to 
be expected from life’s minor diversions to the degree of success to be 
expected for lift’s major enterprises depends on the accuracy of our an- 
swers. 
Logically, answers to such questions rest on our beliefs about correla- 
tions, for example, correlations between different raters’ evaluations of 
movies or correlations between fairness and agreeableness in different 
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situations over time. How accurate are people’s estimates of such corre- 
lations? Since the study of the correlations that underlie interrater agree- 
ment and behavioral consistency is the province of the field of psycho- 
metrics., this question may be rephrased in a way that is suggestive of the 
methodology that might be used to pursue it: How accurate is lay psy- 
chometrics? 
Surprisingly little direct evidence is available on the question of lay 
accuracy about everday life correlations. On the other hand, a great deal 
of indirect evidence bears on this question. Walter Mischel (1968) and 
Donald Peterson (1968) set off a debate that has raged within the person- 
ality area for almost two decades by proposing that (a) the actual consis- 
tency of behavior across different situations generally presumed to tap 
the same trait or disposition is very low, and (b) people believe that be- 
havioral consistency is high, and (c) people therefore suffer from what 
might be called an “illusion of consistency.” There is little doubt that (a) 
is correct. Recent reviews indicate that the average correlation between 
any two phenotypically different behaviors generally presumed to tap the 
same trait (e.g., honesty, friendliness, dependency, hostility, extraver- 
sion) achieves a level of .15 or less (e.g., Mischel & Peake, 1982; Nisbett 
1980). 
Is (b) correct? Do people believe that the true correlation is in excess 
of that found in the literature? Some psychologists clearly do, at any rate. 
The major response by personality psychologists to the Mischel and Pe- 
terson critique was simply to deny, on methodological grounds that are in 
our view quite unconvincing, that the empirical evidence was very good 
(e.g., Block, 1977, Olweus, 1977). There is also considerable indirect evi- 
dence that laypeople overestimate behavioral consistency (Jones & Nis- 
bett, 1972; Mischel, 1968; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977). But the 
only direct evidence for this, to our knowledge, is a study by Jennings, 
Amabile, and Ross (1982). 
Further evidence suggesting that people are sometimes inaccurate in 
perceiving correlations comes from research in the judgment and deci- 
sion tradition. Two major findings about people’s statistical failings seem 
particularly pertinent. 
1. People have been shown in many laboratory studies to have difti- 
culty in detecting covariation between complex events of a kind resem- 
bling those of daily life (Chapman, 1967; Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 
1969; Golding & Rorer, 1972; Hamilton, 1979; Jennings et al., 1982; Nis- 
bett & Ross, 1980). For example, subjects find it difficult to perceive 
accurately the covariation between Rorschach signs seen by clients and 
the clients’ symptoms. 
2. People often fail to apply the law of large numbers to everyday life 
events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974). 
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This bias is highly relevant to estimation of correlations because the so- 
called aggregation principle, a derivation of the law of large numbers, 
governs the association between reliability of evidence and correlation 
magnitude. The most important implication of the principle is that corre- 
lation is a function of the number of units underlying each observation. 
Thus, for example, IQ tests typically have test-retest (total-total) corre- 
lations of .90 or higher, but this is based on individual question (item- 
item) correlations of .10 or less. Similarly, as Epstein (1979, in press) has 
recently emphasized, the . lo-. 15 correlations characteristic of social be- 
havior from situation to situation translate into substantial consistency of 
behavior at highly aggregated levels. Thus, applying the Spearman- 
Brown prophecy formula to item-item correlations of. 15 gives a correla- 
tion of .78 between the average level of behavior on 20 occasions with the 
average level on 20 other occasions. Empirical research indicates that the 
Spearman-Brown formula provides a very good approximation to actual 
aggregation effects both for interrater agreement (Epstein, 1983; Mosko- 
witz & Schwartz, 1982) and for behavioral consistency (Epstein, 1979; 
Hartshorne & May, 1928; Mischel & Peake, 1982; Moskowitz & 
Schwartz, 1982; Newcomb, 1929). (For a review of evidence on aggrega- 
tion, see Rushton, Brainerd, & Pressley, 1983.) 
The aggregation principle is relevant to estimation of everyday life cor- 
relations because it provides a means of assessing unobserved correla- 
tions. Even if one has never observed a correlation at the group level, 
say, for the agreement between two college classes in their evaluations of 
movies, one could make a good estimate of it by using an accurate esti- 
mate at the individual level and applying the aggregation principle. Simi- 
larly, an estimate of the stability of behaviors from one situation to an- 
other can be obtained by applying the aggregation principle to one’s be- 
liefs about longterm stability of behavior. 
The evidence on people’s statistical capabilities is mixed, however. 
Several studies show that people can detect correlations involving rela- 
tively barren laboratory stimuli such as columns of numbers and pairs of 
dial readings (e.g., Beach & Scopp, 1966; Erlick, 1966; Et-lick & Mills, 
1967; Jennings et al., 1982; Wright, 1962; see Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984, 
and Cracker, 1981, for reviews; although the work of Jennings et al. indi- 
cates that people may have difficulty detecting correlations much below 
.6 even with stimuli of that type). 
We and our colleagues (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983) re- 
cently have shown that people also have substantial ability to use at least 
some variants of the law of large numbers, for at least some types of 
problems. The factors we found to influence its use are relevant to 
present concerns. 
1. People are more likely to use the law of large numbers for events 
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that are highly “codable” than for events that are less codable. Nisbett et 
al. defined codability as the ease with which events may be unitized and 
given a score characterizing them in clear and readily interpretable terms. 
Sports events tend to be highly codable in this sense. In principle, a ma- 
chine could code most of the relevant events in a basketball game- 
number of baskets per player, number of baskets per ball handling, and 
so on. Some other events related to achievements tend to be highly cod- 
able, or at any rate to come to us in highly coded form. For example, 
academic performance is usually assessed by assigning numerical values 
to clearly defined units of performance, and accomplishments in various 
occupations are often similarly coded, for example, number of manufac- 
tured objects produced, sales made, or cases won. In contrast, social 
behavior is rarely so codable. When comparing friendliness across two 
occasions, for example, there is no obvious unit to use. Should we use 
smiles per minute or “good vibrations” per social exchange? Score as- 
signment poses similar problems, especially for purposes of comparing 
different people in different situations: What coding scheme will allow 
you to directly compare the degree of friendliness that Jane showed at the 
party with the degree of friendliness that Bill showed at the meeting? 
Nisbett et al. (as well as Jepson, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1983, and Fong, 
Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986) found that subjects were much more likely to 
apply the law of large numbers to highly codable problems about athletics 
and other kinds of achievements than to less codable problems involving 
social behavior. They also found that manipulations designed to help 
people code events in such a way that the law of large numbers could be 
applied to them resulted in more reasoning in accordance with the law. 
2. People are more likely to use the law of large numbers for highly 
familiar domains and problem types. For example, subjects with experi- 
ence in team sports were more likely to use the law of large numbers for a 
problem about football than subjects without experience in sports, and 
subjects with experience in acting were more likely to use the law of large 
numbers for a problem about acting than subjects without experience in 
acting. The fact that people are more likely to use the law of large 
numbers for familiar domains is undoubtedly due in large part to the fact 
that more familiar events are apt to be more codable, and hence the rele- 
vance of the law is more apparent. 
Thus, the literature is mixed with respect to people’s ability to estimate 
important correlations in everyday life. On the one hand, there are some 
conspicuous cognitive and statistical incapacities that might lead us to 
suspect that such estimations would pose very severe difficulties. On the 
other hand, the evidence is indirect, other indirect evidence suggests that 
accuracy may be possible at times, and several theorists have argued that 
the biases that produce errors in person perception in the laboratory may 
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be muted in everyday life contexts (e.g., Hogarth, 1980; Miller & Cantor, 
1982; Swann, 1984). There would appear to be no substitute for actually 
examining some real everyday life correlations and determining how ac- 
curate people’s beliefs about them are. 
Our experimental work leads us to expect that both familiarity and cod- 
ability of events are important determinants of accuracy. We examine 
the effects of familiarity in the context of beliefs about the degree of 
agreement that exists for different kinds of evaluations. Evaluations do 
not in general pose severe coding problems. Jane’s report that she liked 
the movie is a clear unit (one person’s evaluation) with a clear code that 
may be compared at least on an ordinal scale to one’s own evaluation and 
to those of other people. This is not to say that beliefs about evaluations 
are error free, since people may dissemble and data about evaluations 
may be biased in other respects as well. But the barriers to accurate per- 
ception of interrater agreement would not seem to be insurmountable. 
We expect people to be accurate about the degree of agreement that 
exists for familiar kinds of evaluations. 
We examine the effects of codability on accuracy in the context of be- 
liefs about the consistency of highly familiar behaviors. We expect people 
to be more accurate about correlations involving highly codable events 
than about correlations involving less codable events. This means we ex- 
pect them to be more accurate about correlations involving ability- and 
achievement-related behavior than about social trait-related behavior. In 
both cases, we expect people to be accurate only about events at levels of 
aggregation that they have actually observed, since our previous work 
suggests that people do not have a firm understanding of the law of large 
numbers in the abstract and cannot be expected to be able to steer from 
observed to unobserved levels of aggregation. 
A METRIC FOR MEASURING BELIEFS ABOUT CORRELATION 
It would obviously be very useful to have a metric for measuring 
people’s beliefs about correlations that mapped in some clear way onto 
the statistician’s methods of measuring correlations. We propose that an 
appropriate metric would be one based on judgments of contingent prob- 
ability, which people do with ease and, often, with substantial accuracy 
as well. 
As it happens, one kind of probability estimate has a direct interpreta- 
tion as a kind of correlation coefficient. The probability of the reversal of 
a pair ordering is a direct measure of Kendall’s T which is defined as the 
proportion of pairs of objects having the same relative order in their 
ranking on two variables (for example, the proportion of pairs in which 
observer X thinks A > B and observer Y also thinks A > B) minus the 
proportion of pairs showing different relative order in the two rankings 
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(that is, the proportion of pairs in which observer X thinks A > B and 
observer Y thinks A < B). Tau yields, by derivation, an estimate of 
Spearman’s r: E(r) = sin (&2) (Kendall, 1962, p. 124). Table 1 shows 
how these percentage estimates map onto correlation coefficients. 
In all the studies that follow, we asked subjects to estimate the proba- 
bility that two pairs of observations would have the same rank ordering, 
for example, the probability that two individuals or groups would agree 
on the ranking of objects. The general format of the questions for inter- 
rater agreement was, “Suppose X thought A was greater than B. What do 
you suppose is the probability that Y would also think that A was greater 
than B?” 
Subjects had no difficulty in answering such questions and, in fact, 
were able at times to provide probability estimates that were strikingly 
accurate estimates of actual correlations, as will be seen. In most studies, 
we calibrated subjects by pointing out that an estimate of SO is tanta- 
mount to guessing that there is no relationship between X’s and Y’s 
opinion, .60 is tantamount to a slight relationship, and so on. 
In studies that paralleled those to be reported, we sometimes specified 
a magnitude of an evaluation or a magnitude of a comparative evaluation. 
For example, “Suppose X thought A was very good. What do you sup- 
pose is the probability that Y would also think that A was very good?” 
Or, “Suppose X thought that A was much greater than B. What do you 
suppose is the likelihood that Y would also think that A was much greater 
than B?” Answers to these questions have no clear interpretation as cor- 
relations, but they yielded results that are entirely comparable to those 
reported. In particular, the results for subjects’ recognition of the aggre- 
gation principle were always the same whether the simple contingent 
probability was estimated or one of these latter two probabilities. 
TABLE 1 
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In all the studies that follow, we report results in terms of correlations, 
although they are based on subjects’ percentage estimates for contingent 
probabilities, and all statistical tests are based on the percentage esti- 
mates. We do this because only correlations can be manipulated using the 
Spearman-Brown formula and because this is a convenient way of com- 
municating with psychologists, who often think about association and 
prediction in terms of correlation coefficients. In particular, the contro- 
versy about the consistency of trait-related behaviors, for which our data 
have important implications, has been in terms of the magnitude of corre- 
lations. 
To maintain complete comparability between estimated and actual cor- 
relations, the latter also were always derived from 7 coefficients. But as a 
practical matter, it would have made almost no difference whether we 
presented standard Pearson r’s, Spearman r’s derived from 7’s or r’s de- 
rived from T’S at the opposite level of aggregation from the target level 
and calculated by means of the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula. 
Differences among the three techniques were always trivial. Unless oth- 
erwise stated, subjects from whom estimates were obtained were Univer- 
sity of Michigan undergraduates of both sexes who were enrolled in in- 
troductory psychology. No sex differences in estimates of correlation 
were found, 
INTERRATER AGREEMENT 
In the first series of studies to be presented, we examined actual inter- 
rater agreement among people for evaluations of different kinds of ob- 
jects and we examined people’s beliefs about agreement. The evaluations 
differed in their degree of familiarity. In the first study we examined eval- 
uations that were familiar both at low levels of aggregation (item-item) 
and at high levels of aggregation (total-total). In the second study we 
examined evaluations that were familiar only at low levels of aggregation. 
In the third study we examined evaluations that were familiar at neither 
level of aggregation. The anticipation was that subjects would be more 
accurate in their estimations of correlation for types of evaluations that 
they had actually observed and that their estimations would be more in 
line with the requirements of the aggregation principle. 
Study 1: Beliefs about Agreement for Course Evaluations 
In the first study, we examined college students’ beliefs about the de- 
gree of agreement that exists for evaluations of college courses at two 
levels of aggregation -the level of individuals and the level of the popula- 
tion of students who took the course. Students often exchange opinions 
about courses and thus could be familiar with the degree of agreement to 
be expected between any two individuals. Students are also familiar with 
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the stability of course evaluations at the aggregate level. Some courses 
are known to be terrific term after term, others are perennially awful or 
mediocre. In addition, at some universities, including the University of 
Michigan, where the study was conducted, aggregate level agreement can 
be examined by noting the stability of summaries of course evaluations 
from term to term. 
Method 
Actual ratings. Total-to-total correlations for course evaluations were obtained by corre- 
lating the average course ratings published in the Michigan Student Assembly (MSA) course 
evaluation guide for 1 year with those published in the guide for the next year. These 
averages were based on ratings provided by students who filled out the evaluation ques- 
tionnaire at the end of the term while waiting to register for the following term’s classes. 
They evaluated the overall quality of all the courses they had attended that term on the 
same scale used to evaluate students’ class work, which is a 13-point scale ranging from E 
to A + . For our calculation we included all the courses that were taught by the same pro- 
fessor both years and whose published ratings both years were based on at least 20 stu- 
dents, a total of 65 courses. Each course was rated by 71 students on the average, so the 
item-to-item correlations were estimated by applying Spearman-Brown to the actual total- 
to-total correlations using an N of 7 I. (Where actual correlations have been estimated rather 
than calculated directly, this is indicated on figures by an open triangle.) 
Estimates. There were 63 subjects. Subjects in the item-to-item condition estimated the 
likelihood that they would agree with another student, identified as J.K., on the ranking of 
two courses. Subjects in the total-to-total condition estimated the likelihood that the MSA 
rankings of two courses would agree with the MSA rankings of the same courses obtained 
the previous year. 
Results 
Figure 1 presents actual and estimated correlations. It may be seen that 
subjects’ estimates are highly accurate. Both item-to-item and total-to- 
total estimates were very close to the respective actual correlations and 
not significantly different from them. The estimates are also in line with 
those required by the aggregation principle. Tests carried out on the raw 
percentage estimates showed that neither of the estimated correlations 
was significantly different from the correlation predicted from subjects’ 
estimates at the opposite level of aggregation (open circles in Fig. I).’ 
These data establish that people are capable of very great accuracy 
about covariation at two quite different levels of aggregation. Is the accu- 
racy due at least in part to recognition of the force of the aggregation 
principle or is it due solely to the fact that subjects are familiar with the 
(highly codable) data at various levels of aggregation? These data cannot 
1 The Spearman-Brown predicted correlations and the actual correlations were con- 
verted into percentage estimates. Both the Spearman-Brown predicted value and actual 
value were treated as mu when comparing estimates to them. All p values reported are 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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FIG. 1. Average actual (-) and estimated (- - -) correlations at both levels of aggregation 
for course evaluations. Open geometrical shapes indicate r predicted by Spearman-Brown 
from estimated r at the opposite level of aggregation. 
answer this question. We pursue it in the following two studies in which 
the evaluations at the aggregate level are less familiar than is the case 
with course evaluations. 
Study 2: Beliefs about Agreement for Attributes of People 
Subjects proved remarkably accurate in their estimates of correlations 
for evaluations of courses. Would they be equally accurate in their esti- 
mates of correlations for evaluations of people? People spend a great deal 
of time discussing the attributes of other people, so we may presume 
reasonable familiarity with the relevant data on agreement. At least this is 
true for individual or item-item level data. People probably have little 
opportunity for observing aggregate level agreement about the attributes 
of other people, since these are rarely discussed or otherwise expressed 
in large group settings. If, however, people are capable of using the ag- 
gregation principle to estimate aggregate level agreement, then they 
might nevertheless be accurate about correlations based on aggregate 
data. 
To obtain data concerning actual agreement, we contacted two rela- 
tively small sororities and asked all the members to rate each other on a 
number of personality traits and other personal characteristics such as 
attractiveness and degree of overweight. Beliefs about these correlations 
were obtained from a different group of subjects who assessed the agree- 
ment among any two individuals or groups of 20 individuals on the same 
personal characteristics. 
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Method 
Actual ratings. Subjects were members of two small sororities who had both agreed to 
answer our questionnaire in exchange for a $100 honorarium. Members responded in a 
group session held at the sorority. The first sorority included 16 members, all of whom 
responded to the questionnaire. The second sorority included 33 members, 14 of whom 
were unable to attend the scheduled session, leaving a total of 19 respondents. For each 
sorority, a list of all the members was obtained in advance, and the questionnaire, which 
was presented as concerned with social perception, required the subjects to rate all 
members of the sorority on a 6-point scale on 11 characteristics-warmth, talkativeness, 
frankness, fussiness, poise, the extent to which the respondent liked the member, intelli- 
gence, attractiveness, degree of overweight, height, and shyness. 
Estimates. A total of 55 introductory psychology subjects assessed agreement either at 
the item-to-item level or at the total-to-total level. Subjects were asked to imagine that a 
group of people who knew each other well, such as members of a fraternity or sorority, all 
rated each other on a series of dimensions. Some subjects in the item-to-item condition 
were asked to estimate the probability that they would agree with another group member on 
the ranking of two other members of the group for the attribute. Other subjects were asked 
to estimate the probability that the person on their right would agree with another group 
member. No differences were found between subjects making predictions about their own 
rankings and those making predictions about the rankings of the person on their right, so 
their responses were pooled. Subjects in the total-to-total condition predicted the proba- 
bility that the average ranking of two group members by 20 members would agree with the 
average ranking given by 20 other members. 
Results 
Actual ratings. To obtain item-to-item correlations for each character- 
istic, 7 coefficients were obtained in each sorority independently, con- 
verted into correlation coefficients, and then averaged across both soror- 
ities. The correlation between sororities on the coefficients for the 11 
characteristics was .81. The Spearman-Brown formula was used to esti- 
mate the actual total-to-total correlations for an II of 20, since neither 
sorority had enough members to calculate r at this level (actual and 
Spearman-Brown estimated Y’S were virtually identical at n = 9, how- 
ever). 
Estimates. Figure 2 presents actual and estimated correlations at the 
item-to-item level. It may be seen that subjects were very well calibrated 
indeed in their guesses about the degree of agreement between two indi- 
viduals. The correlation between the estimated and the acutal item-to- 
item correlations is remarkably high-.93. It may also be seen that sub- 
jects systematically overestimated this agreement. The mean discrep- 
ancy between estimated and actual r is .20, which is statistically 
significant, t(35) = 8.55, p < .OOl. It should be noted that this does not 
establish that subjects overestimate the correlation in the data available 
to them. It may be that people mute their opinions about others and mask 
any disagreements. If so, then our subjects might be giving accurate esti- 
mates -of the biased correlation evidence available to them. 
PSYCHOMETRICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 205 
t 
FIG. 2. Actual (-) and estimated (- - -) correlations at the item-to-item level for evalua- 
tions of attributes of people. 
FIG. 3. Average actual (-) and estimated (- - -) correlations at the total-to-total level for 
evaluations of attributes of people. 
Figure 3 presents actual and estimated correlations at the total-to-total 
level. It may be seen that subjects were not nearly as well calibrated 
about agreement at the aggregate level as they were at the item-to-item 
level. The correlation between estimated and actual correlations at the 
aggregate level was .56, which is significantly lower than the near perfect 
correlation obtained at the item to item level, p < .05. 
Taken together, Fig. 2 and 3 suggest that subjects’ reduced accuracy at 
the total-to-total level results from their failure to recognize the dramatic 
impact of aggregation on correlations. The actual aggregated correlations 
are uniformly very high. Yet subjects believe them to be as low and as 
variable as are the item-to-item correlations, thus markedly underesti- 
mating the actual total-to-total correlations, t(18) = 13.03, p < .OOl, for 
the mean discrepancy between actual and estimated correlation. 
Subjects’ estimates showed no recognition of the aggregation principle. 
When correlations are averaged across all 11 attributes the estimated 
total-to-total correlation is considerably lower than the total-to-total cor- 
relation of .98 that is expected by applying Spearman-Brown to subjects’ 
estimated item-to-item correlation, t(l8) = 16.30, p < .OOl. Similarly, the 
estimated item-to-item correlation is considerably higher than the item- 
to-item correlation of .16 that is expected by applying Spearman-Brown 
to subjects’ estimated total-to-total correlation, t(35) = 21.28, p < ,001. 
There was one exception to the rule that subjects did not recognize that 
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total-to-total correlations are higher than item-to-item correlations, how- 
ever. The exception was for “likability.” The t(53) contrasting the two 
levels of aggregation for likability was 2.73, p < .Ol. It is possible that 
this is merely accidental, inasmuch as we would expect one or more of 
the contrasts to be significant at least at the .lO level by chance. On the 
other hand, it does seem possible that the finding is meaningful. There 
actually exists a concept for aggregate level likability, namely the notion 
of popularity. Perhaps because the likability dimension is so important, 
we tend to pay attention to how well liked people are in general. And, 
unlike for most other dimensions, we often do get opportunities to ob- 
serve liking at the aggregate level. This is sometimes formal, as in voting 
for people for various offices, but more often informal, as when groups of 
people may observe the affective reactions of others. 
(It is quite unlikely that subjects recognized that liking evaluations are 
subject to the aggregation principle simply because they estimated the 
item-item correlations to be very low. In follow-up studies we examined 
subjects’ beliefs about other evaluations for which they had no opportu- 
nity to observe aggregate level agreement, for example, evaluations of 
black and white photographs of people and evaluations of slide photos of 
pictures. Even when subjects’ estimates of item-item correlations were 
as low as .20, they failed to recognize that total-total correlations would 
be higher.) 
Study 3: Beliefs about Agreement for Evaluations of 
Scientific Documents 
In Study 1 subjects’ estimates of correlations were in line with those 
required by the aggregation principle. In Study 2 they were not, despite 
subjects’ accuracy about the relative magnitude of correlations at the 
item-to-item level. The explanation that we prefer for this is that people 
are not sufficiently aware of the aggregation principle in the abstract to 
allow them to apply it to domains where they have observed correlation 
at only one level. A relatively stringent test of this explanation would be 
to examine the estimates of correlation made by subjects who are knowl- 
edgeable about the aggregation principle in the abstract and see if even 
they are unable to apply it to relatively unfamiliar domains. 
In Study 3 we examined psychologists’ beliefs about the degree of 
agreement that exists for evaluations of manuscripts and grant proposals. 
Despite the importance of such documents to their professional lives, few 
psychologists have much familiarity with agreement about them even at 
the individual level. (An exception is those psychologists who review for 
journals, who can usually count on receiving the opinions of another re- 
viewer and the editor. Only for a very few prolific reviewers would this 
amount to very much data, however.) Still fewer psychologists encounter 
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the opinions of others about grant proposals with any regularity. And, of 
course, almost no psychologists ever observe the opinions of aggregates 
of colleagues, for either manuscripts or grant proposals. 
We also studied the beliefs about agreement of lay subjects. Laypeople 
are of course even less familiar with degree of agreement for such evalua- 
tions than psychologists and hence would be expected to show little ac- 
curacy and no ability to make predictions in accordance with the aggre- 
gation principle. 
Method 
Actual rarings. Actual item-to-item correlations for journal manuscripts were obtained 
from ratings given by reviewers of Jmrnal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) 
manuscripts.? Reviewers rated manuscripts on three scales-theoretical contribution, em- 
pirical contribution, and interest value. Actual correlations for NSF proposals were esti- 
mated from data for solid state physics and economics panels obtained by Cole, Cole, and 
Simon (1981). 
Estimufes. Expert subjects were 40 members of an audience attending a symposium on 
statistical aspects of human judgment. Some subjects provided us with estimates of the 
degree of agreement to be expected, on each of the three evaluation scales, between two 
reviewers of manuscripts submitted to JPSP and between two reviewers of grant proposals 
submitted to either the solid state physics or the economics panel of NSF Other subjects 
were asked to guess the degree of agreement for such evaluations to be expected between 
two panels of 8-10 reviewers each. Since the actual correlations for economics and solid 
state physics panels did not differ, nor did either expert or lay estimates of these correla- 
tions, results for the two disciplines were combined. Lay subjects were 120 University of 
Michigan students. 
Results 
It may be seen in Fig. 4 and 5 that both psychologists and lay subjects 
were quite inaccurate about the degree of agreement to be expected of 
the ratings of manuscripts or proposals by any two individuals. In all 
cases the item-to-item correlations were grossly overestimated. All com- 
parisons of estimated item-to-item correlations to actual item-to-item 
correlations were significant at least at the .OOf level. Neither group was 
inaccurate at the total-to-total level for either manuscripts or proposals, 
but it is quite unlikely that this is because of actual observation at this 
level, inasmuch as few psychologists and no lay subjects have ever ob- 
served aggregation at this level. The accuracy at the total-to-total level 
was probably just a matter of chance, since, as we report next, it could 
not have been due to application of the aggregation principle. 
Both psychologists and laypeople expected identical or nearly identical 
* We are grateful to the former editor, Melvin Manis, for allowing us access to these files. 
It should be noted that the correlations are based on ratings by two different consultants for 
each of a number of articles. This method of necessity treats individual differences in rating 
scale usage as error and thus provides a lower bound for the actual reliability that exists. 
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correlations at both levels of aggregation for both JPSP manuscripts and 
NSF proposals. In no case was the estimated total-to-total correlation 
more than trivially higher than the estimated item-to-item correlation (all 
p’s > .25). In all cases, estimated total to total correlations were signifi- 
cantly lower than those expected from applying the Spearman-Brown 
formula to the estimated item-to-item correlations (all p’s < .OOl). Simi- 
larly, estimated item-to-item correlations were all considerably higher 
than those expected from applying Spearman-Brown to the estimated 
total-to-total correlations (all p’s < .OOl). 
In summary, laypeople substantially overestimate the degree of agree- 
ment about manuscripts and grant proposals between any 2 experts, and 
they do not expect agreement to be greater between two panels of 8-10 
experts than between 2 experts. Experts themselves, with substantial 
training in statistics, show an almost identical pattern of expectations. 
This suggests that, even if experts understand the aggregation principle in 
the abstract, they are unable to apply it to important real world evalua- 
tions that they have not actually observed closely. Almost surely, then, 
the same thing is true of lay subjects: Any abstract appreciation of the 
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FIG. 4. Actual correlations (-) and correlations estimated by laypeople and by psychol- 
ogists (- - -) for JPSP manuscript evaluations at both levels of aggregation. Open geomet- 
rical shapes indicate r predicted by Spearman-Brown from estimated r at the opposite level 
of aggregation. 
FIG. 5. Actual correlations (-) and correlations estimated by laypeople and by psychol- 
ogists (- - -) for evaluations of NSF grant proposals, at both levels of aggregation. Open 
geometrical shapes indicate r predicted by Spearman-Brown from estimated r at the oppo- 
site level of aggregation. 
PSYCHOMETRICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 209 
its use in a domain where they are not familiar with data at more than one 
level of aggregation. 
BEHAVIORAL CONSISTENCY 
We have found that when people have had little opportunity to observe 
other peoples’ evaluations of particular objects, they can be quite inaccu- 
rate about the degree of agreement that exists for such evaluations, and 
they are unable to apply the aggregation principle to them. But we have 
found also that people can be quite accurate about other types of evalua- 
tions, so long as they have had the opportunity to observe the data at a 
given level of aggregation. 
There is good reason to believe that the accuracy we found for evalua- 
tions is dependent on their generally high codability. Neither unitization 
nor interpretation of evaluations normally would be a problem for the 
evaluations we studied. But for behavior, where the situation or occasion 
is the natural item, codability can range across a variety of difficulty 
levels. For skill-related behavior such as academic or athletic perfor- 
mance the units-grades or scores-are quite clear and interpretation 
normally poses no problem. In addition, information about abilities typi- 
cally is available at various levels of aggregation. People are given grades 
for individual exams and for entire courses; statistics are available on 
players’ performance both in single games and over entire seasons. Thus, 
for abilities we would expect a fair degree of accuracy both at low levels 
of aggregation and at high levels. 
Social behavior, however, is harder to unitize and more subject to in- 
terpretive vagaries. Thus we would expect people to be less accurate 
about the correlations that exist for social behavior. We expect particu- 
larly poor accuracy at the item-to-item level, where psychologists at any 
rate appear to have been surprised by the lack of consistency from one 
situation to another. 
In the next series of studies we examined people’s beliefs about the 
degree of consistency to be expected for ability-related behaviors and for 
trait-related behaviors, both at the level of individual occasions and at 
highly aggregated levels. 
Study 4: Lay and Expert Perceptions of the Consistency 
of Traits and Abilities 
Method 
Each of 55 University of Michigan students provided estimates of correlations at either 
the item-to-item or the total-to-total level for two traits, namely, honesty and friendliness, 
and for two abilities, namely, basketball scoring ability and spelling ability as measured by 
spelling tests. In addition, the same experts as in Study 3 also provided estimates. Subjects 
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were asked to estimate the probability that for a given trait or ability two individuals would 
maintain their relative ranking from one situation to another (for the item-to-item correla- 
tion) or from the average of 20 situations to the average of 20 other situations (for the 
total-to-total correlation). The item-to-item question for honesty read as follows: “Suppose 
you observed Jane and Jill in a particular situation and found that Jane was more honest 
than Jill. What do you suppose is the probability that in the next situation in which you 
observe them you would also find Jane to be more honest than Jill?” 
The total-to-total version of the question substituted “20 different situations” for “a par- 
ticular situation” and asked the subjects to suppose that Jane had been found to be more 
honest “on the average.” The item-to-item level of aggregation for basketball was the 
number of points scored in a particular game and the total-to-total level was the number 
scored over the first 20 games of the season vs the last 20. The item-to-item level for spelling 
was one test. The total-to-total level was the average for the 20 tests of the first term vs the 
20 tests of the second term. 
Actual correlations for basketball were obtained by correlating the scores of University of 
Michigan players for the previous season. Actual correlations for spelling tests were as- 
sessed by examining spelling scores in 2 fifth-grade classes in two different schools. Actual 
correlations for honesty are available from the landmark work by Hartshorne and May 
(1928) who conducted a study in which they measured the behaviors of thousands of chil- 
dren in situations contrived to measure honesty behavior. The average correlation that they 
obtained across situations was .23, though it should be noted that this should be regarded as 
an upper bound, because the .23 figure is based on values that are themselves aggregations 
in some cases. Actual correlations for friendliness are based on an average from three 
studies that examined people’s friendliness in two or more situations and obtained ratings 
from observers (Bern & Allen, 1974; Chaplin & Goldberg, 1985; Mischel & Peake, 1982). 
The average correlation for these studies was .13, but it should be noted that this correlation 
also is based on aggregated measures for the most part and that the correlation at the level 
of one situation with one other situation would be lower. 
Results 
Subjects’ estimates of the consistency of the traits of honesty and 
friendliness did not differ at either level of aggregation nor did their esti- 
mates of consistency of the abilities of basketball and spelling. The actual 
correlations for the two traits and for the two abilities were also similar. 
So both trait estimates and ability estimates were pooled at each level of 
aggregation and so were the actual correlations. It may be seen in Fig. 6 
that subjects’ estimates were very seriously in error for traits at the item- 
to-item level. This was true both for lay subjects and for expert subjects, 
p < .OOl and < .Ol, respectively. In addition, the experts were also mis- 
taken about the correlation at the total-to-total level, p < .05. We suspect 
that the experts yielded a curve that was lower overall because some of 
them, at least, were aware that traits are not very good predictors. Their 
memories may have been jogged by the presence of Walter Mischel, 
seated prominently in front of the room! 
Unfortunately, neither Mischel’s presence nor the statistical training of 
the expert subjects was sufficient to enable them to recognize the rele- 
vance of the aggregation principle for trait data. Neither they nor the lay 
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FIG. 6. Actual correlations (-) and correlations estimated by laypeople and by psychol- 
ogists (- - -) for trait-related behaviors, at both levels of aggregation. Open geometrical 
shapes indicate r predicted by Spearman-Brown from estimated r at the opposite level of 
aggregation. 
FIG. 7. Actual correlations (-) and correlations estimated by laypeople and by psychol- 
ogists (- - -) for ability-related behaviors, at both levels of aggregation. Open geometrical 
shapes indicate Y predicted by Spearman-Brown from estimated r at the opposite level of 
aggregation. 
subjects provided estimates for the total-to-total level that were signifi- 
cantly different from their estimates for the item-to-item level. In addi- 
tion, both group’s estimates of the item-to-item level correlations were 
very far from the item-to-item correlation predicted from subjects’ esti- 
mates of the correlations at the total-to-total level; p for lay subjects 
<.OOl, p for experts c.01. Finally, both groups’ estimates of the total-to- 
total correlations were very far from the total-to-total predicted from 
subjects’ estimates of the item-to-item correlations; both p’s < .OOl. This 
failure of subjects to recognize that their beliefs about total-to-total cor- 
relations entail very low item-to-item correlations is most probably at the 
heart of many psychologists’ disbelieving reactions to the Mischel and 
Peterson critiques.3 
3 Readers who have been following the literature on the trait controversy will recall that 
Mischel and Peake (1982) argued that people’s tendency to overestimate correlations be- 
tween any two situations is due to their mistaken assumption that (cross-situational) consis- 
tency is as high as (within-situation) temporal stability. In a follow-up study, we modified 
our questions so as to create two clearly different conditions-one in which subjects were 
to make a prediction about the same kind of situation as the one for which they already had 
observations of behavior and one in which they were to make a prediction about a different 
kind of situation. Subjects dramatically overestimated both temporal stability and cross-sit- 
uational consistency. Thus, a failure to distinguish between temporal stability and cross-sit- 
uational consistency is not the only source of overestimation of the latter. 
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Matters are quite different for both lay and expert estimates for abili- 
ties, as may be seen in Fig. 7. Lay estimates at the item-to-item level are 
not different from the actual values, and psychologists’ estimates differ 
from the actual values only at the .lO level. Both lay and expert subjects 
significantly underestimated correlations at the total-to-total level; both 
p’s < .OOl. But it may be seen that both groups recognized that correla- 
tions at the total-to-total level should be greater than at the item-to-item 
level; both p’s < .Ol. 
The results for abilities do not, however, show a full recognition of the 
force of the aggregation principle. Both experts and lay subjects were 
fairly far off the predictions made from estimates by subjects for the op- 
posite level; p for total-to-total level for both groups of subjects < .OOl , p 
for item-to-item level for lay subjects <.OOl, for psychologists <.05. And 
the experts show no better recognition of the differences at the two levels 
than do lay subjects; F( 1,70) for difference between slopes < 1. 
The major anticipations thus were supported fully. Both lay and expert 
subjects severely overestimated the consistency of trait-related behavior 
at the level of the situation. Both groups’ estimates of correlation for 
traits failed to show any influence of the aggregation principle. Estimates 
made by both groups for abilities were relatively accurate at the item-to- 
item level and showed some congruence with the aggregation principle. It 
therefore appears that greater codability contributes to greater accuracy 
about correlations and to greater appreciation of the aggregation prin- 
ciple . 
Study 5: Predicting Trait-Based and Ability-Based Outcomes 
An important suggestion of Study 4 is that people actually may believe 
that social trait-related behaviors are more consistent, and therefore 
more predictable, than ability-related behaviors. Lay subjects estimated 
that trait-related behaviors were more highly correlated than ability-re- 
lated behaviors both at the item-to-item level, p < .OOl, and at the total- 
to-total level, p < .Ol. This, of course, reverses the true state of affairs, 
since the abilities we examined were in fact more consistent than the 
traits. In Study 5 we explored the implications of this finding. We studied 
an outcome that we expected that most people would regard as primarily 
ability based, namely grade point average (GPA), and an outcome that we 
expected that most people would regard as trait based, namely success as 
a community action organizer in the Peace Corps. We wanted to deter- 
mine whether subjects would think that success in the Peace Corps was 
more predictable than GPA. 
For both outcomes, we examined subjects’ beliefs about predictability 
based on an interview. Interviews have been shown to have little predic- 
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tive power for either intellectual performance or for various kinds of job 
performance. Most validity coefficients are correlations of less than .lO 
(cf. Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). But, because of the 
power of the consistency illusion, it could be anticipated that subjects 
would overestimate the predictability attainable on the basis of an inter- 
view, especially for the outcome based on social traits. We also examined 
subjects’ beliefs about the predictability of both outcomes based on 
highly aggregated forms of evidence-the reports of acquaintances in the 
case of the Peace Corps outcome and high school GPA in the case of the 
college GPA outcome. 
Method 
One hundred thirty-two Michigan students assessed the predictability of yearlong perfor- 
mance in the Peace Corps from either a single event, namely an interview, or from an 
aggregate of events, namely the average rating given to letters of recommendation by 
teachers, ministers, and community leaders who knew the applicants well. Other subjects 
assessed the predictability of overall University of Michigan GPA, either from an interview 
or from a different kind of aggregate-high school GPA. The actual predictability of Peace 
Corps performance from an interview and from letters of recommendation were obtained 
from Stein (1966). The actual predictability of GPA at the University of Michigan from high 
school GPA was provided by Michigan’s admissions office. Our estimate for the actual 
predictability of GPA from an interview is somewhat arbitrary. The .07 estimate reflects the 
fact that all coefficients for interview validity with which we are familiar are nonnegative, 
while cross-validated coefficient rarely exceeds .lO (see, for example, Klitgaard, 1985; 
Mayfield, 1964; Ulrich & Tiumbo, 1965). 
Results 
Figures 8 and 9 present predicted and actual correlations for both types 
of outcomes. The most striking finding is that people appear to believe 
that Peace Corps performance is far more predictable than it actually is, 
for both kinds of evidence. The validity coefIicient for job interviews, in 
general, and for the Peace Corps interview, in particular, is less than . 10, 
yet subjects estimated that it was .59, t(33) = 7.75, p < .OOl. The validity 
coefficient for the letters of recommendation was .35, yet subjects esti- 
mated that it was .66, t(32) = 4.47, p < .Ol. 
Subjects do not overestimate the predictability of the ability-based 
GPA outcome to anything like the same extent, though they do signiti- 
cantly overestimate the predictability of GPA from the interview, t(32) = 
4.08, p < .OOl. Ironically, subjects tended to underestimate the predict- 
ability of GPA from the modestly valid predictor of high school GPA, 
t(31) = 2.60, p < .05. 
Finally, subjects believed that Peace Corps performance is consider- 
ably more predictable from an interview than is GPA, t(65) = 2.99, p < 
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FIG. 8. Actual (-) and estimated (- - -) correlations for the prediction of Peace Corps 
performance from an interview and from an aggregate (letters of recommendation). 
FIG. 9. Actual (-) and estimated (- - -) correlations for the prediction of college GPA 
from an interview and from an aggregate (high school GPA). 
.Ol. Similarly, when predicting from aggregates of events, subjects be- 
lieve Peace Corps performance to be far more predictable than GPA, 
t(63) = 4.70, p < .OOl (though here it should be noted that we are com- 
paring aggregated apples with aggregated oranges). 
Thus it appears that subjects do not realize that chance plays at least as 
big a role in affecting a trait-based outcome as it does in affecting an 
ability-based outcome. They seem to believe that in a single interview 
one can figure out how people will behave in novel situations over a long 
period of time. The “interview illusion” exists for both the ability-based 
outcome and the trait-based outcome, but it seems to be more acute for 
the latter. 
The data are also suggestive of a lack of appreciation of the aggregation 
principle in the domain of traits. Subjects do not expect the predictability 
of Peace Corps performance from an aggregated measure of acquaintance 
to be any greater than that obtained from a single exposure: They believe 
that one observer who has interacted with a person for a single hour can 
predict the person’s behavior just as well as the aggregated assessment of 
several people who know the person well (t < 1). (This observation must 
be treated only as a tentative suggestion, however, because the units that 
are aggregated by acquaintances include information of a different type 
than is conveyed in an interview. And of course the study does not permit 
evaluation of people’s appreciation of the aggregation principle for abili- 
ties because the aggregated measure, namely high school GPA, was com- 
posed of completely different types of information than the single-item 
measure, namely the interview.) 
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APPRECIATION OF THE AGGREGATION PRINCIPLE 
Study 6: Cuing Recognition of the Aggregation Principle 
The data so far suggest that neither laypeople nor psychologists have a 
sufficiently robust appreciation of the aggregation principle in the ab- 
stract to ensure that they will apply it to unfamiliar data or to data that 
are difficult to code. In Study 3, both expert and lay subjects failed to 
show any recognition of the aggregation principle when estimating corre- 
lations for relatively unfamiliar data concerning manuscripts and grant 
proposals. In Study 4 both groups failed to show any recognition of the 
principle when making estimates about the consistency of difficult-to- 
code, trait-related behavior. The data do suggest, however, that subjects 
may make use of the aggregation principle if the data are codable and are 
familiar at more than one level of aggregation, as they are for abilities 
(Study 4) and for course evaluations (Study 1). This would imply a highly 
domain-specific ability to apply the aggregation principle and would be 
consistent with the domain specificity found for various other versions of 
the law of large numbers (Fong et al., 1986; Jepson et al., 1983; Nisbett et 
al., 1983). It is also possible, though, that neither laypeople nor experts 
have any ability to apply the aggregation principle to the data of everyday 
life: Both groups seem to be accurate if the data are easily codable and 
have been observed at a given level of aggregation and neither is accurate 
if either of these requirements is violated. And psychologists show no 
more recognition of the principle when making judgments about abilities 
than do lay subjects. Such limited accuracy could be due entirely to the 
correct detection of, and memory for, the covariations at each level of 
aggregation. 
A better way to test whether people appreciate statistical rules is to use 
studies employing within-subject designs (cf. Fischhoff, Slavic, & Lich- 
tenstein, 1979). In Study 6, we examined whether subjects could be cued 
to recognize the aggregation principle by requiring them to answer for 
two levels of aggregation. In previous studies we required subjects to 
answer for only one level of aggregation. This may have made it harder 
for subjects to recognize the relevance of the principle even if they had 
some understanding of it in the abstract and some ability to apply it under 
optimal circumstances. We examined estimates of the consistency of 
trait- and ability-related behaviors. 
The design was identical to that of Study 4 except that instead of 
having subjects make estimates for both traits and abilities either at the 
item-to-item or the total-to-total level of aggregation, they made esti- 
mates for only one of the traits or abilities at both the item-to-item and 
the total-to-total level. In addition, half of the 144 subjects were required 
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to justify their answers: “If your answers to the above two questions 
were not identical, please indicate why.” 
The results were dramatic and clear-cut. The within design caused 
subjects to give estimates for both traits and abilities that were more in 
line with the aggregation principle. In both cases the interaction between 
level of aggregation and design was significant, F(1,199) = 10.08, p < 
.OOl for traits, F(1,191) = 4.53, p < .05 for abilities.4 In both cases the 
effect was produced entirely by lowering the estimate of the item-to-item 
level correlation-from .77 to Sl for traits, and from Sl to .28 for abili- 
ties. 
Requiring subjects to justify different answers at the two levels had no 
effect over and above simply requiring them to answer for both levels, 
but the open-ended justification data make it very clear that subjects do 
indeed appreciate the aggregation principle when the problem context 
cues them to its relevance. Two examples of answers are given below. 
The first is a justification for giving a higher estimate for the total-to-total 
level for traits. The second is a justification for giving a higher estimate 
for the total-to-total level for abilities. 
It is very possible for one to misjudge a person in a given situation. However, 
after observing many more situations the average reaction to one’s actions be- 
comes more accurate. 
It can simply be a fluke (i.e., Johnny could have had a good day), while an 
average grade is reflective of his whole attitude and study capabilities in that 
course. 
Altogether, 80% of the answers given by subjects in the no-justification 
condition and 78% of the answers given by subjects in the justification 
condition indicated that subjects believed that total-to-total correlations 
were higher than item-to-item correlations. Eighty-seven percent of the 
justifications for answers indicating that total-to-total correlations were 
higher gave as the reason at least some crude version of the aggregation 
principle as the justification for the answer. 
Undoubtedly real problems sometimes do provide reminders of the 
sort given in our study, and so people probably are capable of using the 
aggregation principle occasionally even in domains that are unfamiliar or 
hard to code. But it would be a mistake to assume that correlations at a 
level different from the focal one are normally salient to people. The 
structure of most inference tasks is of the form “What prediction do I 
make given the evidence?” rather than of the form “What prediction do I 
make given the evidence and given what I would guess the evidence to 
4 For the purpose of this analysis the “within” data were treated as though they were 
“between.” The resulting p levels thus are very conservative. 
PSYCHOMETRICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 217 
look like if there were more (or less) of it ?” Life, as Nisbett and Ross 
(1980) put it, has a between design, and we all too rarely conduct thought 
experiments having a within design. In addition, though subjects in 
within conditions showed some appreciation of the aggregation principle, 
they did not show enough: Their judgments showed very insufficient in- 
fluence of the principle for both traits and abilities, and they still mark- 
edly overestimated trait consistency at the level of the situation, p < 
.OOl. 
Domain Specijkity of Recognition of the Aggregation Principle 
The aggregation principle appears to resemble other versions of the law 
of large numbers in that spontaneous appreciation of the principle is ex- 
tremely domain and problem specific. Although people can be cued to 
apply the principle even to difficult domains, spontaneous recognition of 
the aggregation principle seems to occur only in domains where people 
are able to detect covariations at more than one level. Even when sub- 
jects accurately perceive item-to-item correlations to be very low, they 
do not use the aggregation principle to extrapolate to total-to-total corre- 
lations unless they have also had the opportunity to perceive that the 
total-to-total correlations are high. Accurate covariation detection in a 
given domain, at more than one level of aggregation, may be required if 
the rule is to be induced in that domain. 
Thus, ironically, people are probably able to apply the aggregation 
principle best for domains for which they already have had substantial 
opportunity to observe covariation. They may not benefit much from its 
use in domains where it would be most beneficial-domains where they 
are familiar with covariation at only one level of aggregation, or at no 
level. As a consequence, people make very serious errors when assessing 
covariation. When they are familiar only with covariation at the item-to- 
item level, as in several of the domains we examined, they tend to grossly 
underestimate covariation at the total-to-total level. It seems likely that 
when they are familiar only with covariation at the total-to-total level, 
they would tend to grossly overestimate covariation at the item-to-item 
level. And when they have no familiarity with a domain, they seem sure 
to make at least one of these errors. 
DISCUSSION 
How accurate, then, is lay psychometrics? When people make esti- 
mates of the correlations that guide their predictions and choices in 
everyday life, how likely are they to be correct? 
The correlations that we examined do not constitute a random sample 
of everyday life correlations, nor anything approximating such a sample. 
Nevertheless, the types of correlations are sufficiently representative and 
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diverse, and the degree of accuracy found is sufficiently broad, that three 
important generalizations may be proffered. 
1. Notwithstanding people’s demonstrated difftculties in assessing co- 
variation and their lack of abstract appreciation of the law of large 
numbers, they are capable of impressive accuracy when making esti- 
mates of some important kinds of everyday life correlations. 
2. The accuracy that we found was limited to cases where several im- 
portant factors were all favorable to correct estimation. 
3. We found serious inaccuracy where these factors were less favor- 
able. Such inaccuracy was found even where the events in question are 
both common and important and even when the judges were expert in 
both psychology and statistics. We shall now amplify each of these 
points. 
Factors Influencing Accuracy about Predictions for Social Events 
We have found that people can be remarkably accurate about correla- 
tions in the social world if each of three conditions obtain. Two of these 
have been discussed at length already. They are (a) familiarity with the 
data and (b) codability of the data. 
A third factor that undoubtedly influences the accuracy of perceiving 
correlations was not salient to us before we began the research, but is 
clear in retrospect. This is whether or not the data to be correlated are 
drawn from distributions of the same kind of events. There is a two-de- 
cade-old literature showing that people can be reasonably accurate about 
covariation when estimating correlations among two sets of numbers or 
among two sets of readings for pointers on identical dials (e.g., Beach & 
Scopp, 1966; Erlick, 1966; Erlick & Mills, 1967; Wright, 1962). Nisbett 
and Ross (1980) were inclined to attribute accuracy in these cases to the 
impoverishment of the stimuli and a corresponding lack of a priori 
theories that might serve to bias judgments about covariation. But an 
interpretation in terms of common versus disparate event distributions 
seems more likely in view of present results. Most previous research ex- 
amining people’s perception of covariation in social domains has exam- 
ined events drawn from qualitatively different distributions-for ex- 
ample, between “Draw-a-Person” test responses such as treatment of 
the eyes (normal eyes vs large, small or otherwise distorted eyes) and 
psychiatric diagnoses (of paranoia vs some other pathology). While it is 
true that such judgments are rife with opportunities for interference from 
prior theories that people hold, they also present cross-category coding 
problems of a kind that parallel columns of numbers, or concomitant dial 
readings, or most of the events we studied, do not. 
Correlations among variables coming from distributions of the same 
type are much easier to assess because in this case each pair of observa- 
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tions in and of itself contains information, namely, the distance between 
the two observations, that can be used to assess the correlation. For ex- 
ample, when assessing the correlation between people’s opinions about 
courses, we may ask each of two people who have attended a given 
course for their evaluations. A comparison of the distance between the 
evaluations provides us with a rough idea about the correlation. Compare 
this to cases where the two variables of interest come from different dis- 
tributions. For example, imagine trying to estimate the correlation be- 
tween evaluations of a course and performance in the course. We cannot, 
of course, directly compare a person’s evaluation of the course and the 
person’s performance in the course to each other-that would be like 
comparing apples and oranges. Instead, we need to locate the person’s 
evaluation on the distribution of evaluations and do the mental equivalent 
of calculating the person’s percentile score for evaluations, then locating 
the person’s performance on the distribution of performance scores, and 
calculating the person’s percentile score for performance. Only then can 
we compare the two percentile scores to each other to obtain a distance 
estimate. The process is more complicated, and requires knowledge 
about the two distributions, knowledge that is not necessary when as- 
sessing correlation between two identical variables. 
Many important correlations in everyday life are characterized by all 
three of the factors that our research suggests are important, namely fa- 
miliarity, codability, and common distribution of events. Many kinds of 
evaluations, in particular, would seem to meet all three of these criteria. 
In addition, many ability-related behaviors, at least if they are coded on a 
common distribution, would seem to meet our criteria. 
Accuracy about such matters is almost surely of great utility to people. 
They are probably well prepared to take appropriate action on the basis 
of information about the evaluations of others concerning, for example, 
the personal attributes of other people and the desirability of college 
courses. Similarly, they can probably take effective advantage of infor- 
mation about the abilities of others in many athletic, academic, and pro- 
fessional domains. 
Consequences of Inaccuracy about Correlations among Social Events 
But the present results also suggest that the inferential failings that 
have been demonstrated by judgment researchers in laboratory settings 
are sometimes manifested in full force in judgments about everyday 
events. Even for domains where subjects, on average, show substantial 
accuracy, many individuals do not: Not everyone is accurate just because 
the mean is on target. Thus, for example, the mean estimate for the item- 
to-item correlation for the abilities we examined was .5 1, which was al- 
most exactly correct. However, a third of the subjects made guesses 
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about the correlation that were either over .75 or under .31. Similarly, the 
mean estimate for total-to-total correlations for course evaluations was 
.79, which again was almost exactly right. But a third of these subjects 
guessed the correlation to be either as high as .99 or lower than .45. Thus, 
even where the mean was very close to the actual value, many individual 
subjects were quite inaccurate, and their errors would be of the sort that 
could sometimes produce unhappy consequences in their lives. 
Untoward consequences would seem to be the norm for decisions 
and behaviors based on judgments about covariation for which the ma- 
jorify of people are badly mistaken, as in the case of judgments about the 
stability of social behavior and judgments about the reliability at the indi- 
vidual level for judgments about documents such as manuscripts and 
grant proposals. At the very least, such errors mean that we will be con- 
stantly surprised at outcomes. We will be surprised when the woman who 
seemed so nice when the realtor introduced her turns out to be such an 
undesirable neighbor. We will be surprised when the man who made such 
a poor impression in his job interview turns out to be a rising star at the 
institution that (uproariously, we thought at the time) hired him. We will 
be astonished that two such eminent scientists could have such different 
views of the same manuscript. And we will be dubious when psycholog- 
ical research shows low cross-situational consistency for trait-related be- 
haviors. 
But of course our predictions often have consequences beyond mere 
surprise. Our predictions, and the choices they engender, often will pro- 
duce outcomes that are undesirable and that could have been avoided, in 
principle and on the average. We do not hire the candidate who made a 
rather poor personal impression, even though the folder provided clear 
evidence of superiority. We turn to only one or two consultants for help 
in a decision when the outcome is of some real moment either to our- 
selves or to institutions that we value and when there is generally low 
agreement for the relevant judgments. We avoid contact with people who 
strike us as dull, silly, or obnoxious on a brief encounter, even though a 
fair fraction of such people would have been regarded as pleasant or even 
delightful on longer acquaintance. 
Most of the above consequences are not new ones to social psycholo- 
gists. They have for some time been asserted to be the consequence of 
the fundamental attribution error -known to Kurt Lewin, described by 
Fritz Heider, established empirically by Edward E. Jones, named by Lee 
Ross, and documented at length by Nisbett and Ross. We believe, how- 
ever, that the present data provide the best evidence to date for the re- 
ality of the phenomenon. We have little doubt that our method of mea- 
suring people’s beliefs about correlations maps well onto whatever repre- 
sentation people actually use for such judgments. It seems quite unlikely 
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that the estimates in, for example, Fig. 1 presenting estimated correla- 
tions for course evaluations, or Fig. 2 presenting estimated correlations 
for evaluations of the attributes of people, are as close to the actual cor- 
relations as they are simply as a matter of chance. The accuracy that we 
found for many types of correlations, especially in ability domains, indi- 
cates that this representation may be adequate for some of the important 
purposes of daily life. The striking inaccuracy we found for beliefs about 
the consistency of social behavior thus seems all the more real and se- 
rious. If we take the data for lay subjects’ estimates of the stability of 
social behavior at their face value, and we feel justified in doing so, they 
indicate that people are enormously more confident of the expected na- 
ture of a person’s social behavior, given knowledge of the nature of their 
behavior on one occasion, than reality affords them any right to be. This 
is true both for predictions for a single occasion given observation of 
actual behavior in a situation tapping a particular trait (Fig. 6) and for 
predictions for complex behavior over a long period given observation in 
an interview (Fig. 8). 
The implications of these results for the trait controversy should be 
spelled out explicitly. In our view, the debate has lasted as long as it has 
because psychologists’ intuitions, like those of laypeople, tell them that 
there is very substantial predictability at the level of individual acts, as 
much predictability in fact as at highly aggregated levels. The error here 
is a very basic one, amounting not merely to an empirical mistake, but to 
literal incoherence. What both psychologists and laypeople do not realize 
is that their beliefs about predictability at the aggregate level actually 
preclude a belief in comparable predictability at the individual level. This 
is powerful testimony to the strength of the illusions underlying percep- 
tion of personal consistency. 
Statistical Expertise and Intuitive Psychometrics 
Can anything be done about the fundamental attribution error and 
about related errors in perceiving covariation in the social domain? The 
present data have important implications for the possibility of improving 
lay psychometrics. It is clear that abstract training in statistical principles 
will not suffice to alleviate all of people’s difficulties, or perhaps any of 
them. Even statistically knowledgeable people were unable to recognize 
the aggregation principle for data with which they were unfamiliar or for 
data that are hard to code, and their judgments were not more guided by 
the principle than those of laypeople (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). 
On the other hand, even laypeople were able to recognize the aggregation 
principle for the highly problematic trait domain when strongly cued to 
do so in a within-subject design. This suggests that the key to improving 
lay psychometrics lies not so much in teaching people abstract principles 
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as in teaching people to map the elements of unfamiliar domains onto 
such principles. This may be done even for domains that are difficult to 
unitize if people are prompted to assess the relative numbers of units in 
different types of information. For example, even if one does not know 
exactly what units to use to measure friendliness, it is useful to realize 
that, whatever the unit, there will be far more units in a yearlong ac- 
quaintance than in an hourlong interview. Our within-subject study sug- 
gests that the simple thought experiment of considering the predictability 
of behavior over the long haul when making predictions about behavior 
over the “short haul” is sufficient to drive down people’s estimates of the 
predictability of one behavior from one other behavior, and thus to im- 
prove accuracy. 
The value of teaching people to map events onto statistical principles 
has been demonstrated by Fong et al. (1986). They studied several prin- 
ciples derivable from the law of large numbers and showed that abstract 
training in the law and training in mapping everyday events onto the law 
each contributed independently to improving statistical reasoning. 
Thus it would be premature to be pessimistic about the possibility that 
training might improve people’s ability to recognize the applicability of 
the aggregation principle across a wide domain of events and problem 
types. We already know that even modest amounts of statistical training 
can have a big impact on some types of judgment, and we have little basis 
for predicting how much more improvement is feasible. 
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